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CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS

Furthermore, the bar associations should assume an active and aggressive role in supervising the prosecutors in the performance of the
tasks of their office where there is reason to
believe that diligence and honesty are being
side-stepped. In turn, the prosecutor must
exercise similar supervision over other law enforcement officials.
To effectively suppress organized crime, it is
mandatory that there be cooperation at all
levels of law enforcement. Corruption on any
level must be attacked in such a manner as will
and removed from the county payroll. The chief of
police of Cicero, Illinois, and a subordinate were
indicted and removed from office. Gambling in
Chicago and Cicero closed down for a while, and
have never returned to previous strength, notwithstanding many bad areas still thriving.
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best serve as an example to other officials and
at the same time clearly demonstrate to syndicated criminals that there will be no tolerance
of an alliance between them and the enforcers of
the law. It is suggested that the most effective
means is a fair but systematic use of criminal
prosecutions for misconduct in office. Civil removal actions should be employed only where
it is apparent that criminal prosecution may
prove unsuccessful. If the criminal remedy,
however, is used wisely and not prematurely,
civil removal will become a less frequently used
device than it is at the present time.
(The second article of this symposium will
appear in the next issue. It will be devoted to
"The Investigative Function of the Prosecuting
Attorney.")

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Uncorroborated Testimony of Prosecutrix
Sufficient to Sustain Conviction-The complaining witness alleged that the defendant
had carnal knowledge of her at a time when
she was not yet 16 years old. Under Indiana
law, a person committing such an act with a
minor is guilty of statutory rape. Prior to the
first trial, the prosecutrix paid an unsolicited
visit to the office of the defendant's attorney
and executed an affidavit which stated that
the defendant never had sexual relations with
her. On the initial day of the first trial, she
denied seven times that the defendant had
sexual relations with her, but on the second
day, while emotionally upset, she repeated her
accusation. The defendant's conviction was
reversed because of lack of jurisdiction of the
trial court, and upon retrial he was again
convicted solely on the accusation of the
prosecutrix. The Supreme Court of Indiana,
one judge dissenting, overruled previous
precedent and held that the state need not
require a prosecutrix, whose story is uncorroborated, to submit to a psychiatric examination, and that the uncorroborated testimony
is sufficient to sustain a conviction of statutory
rape. Wedmore v. State, 143 N.E.2d 649 (Ind.
1957).

The majority in the Wedmore case felt that
in the case of Burto= v. State, 232 Ind. 246, 111
N.E.2d 892 (1953), the Supreme Court of
Indiana promulgated a rule that required the
state to support the testimony of a prosecuting
witness in a sex case with a report on the
results of a psychiatric examination given to
the witness. In the present case however, the
court said that it lacked the power and authority to do so and thus "disapproved and
overruled" the Burton case. The Legislature,
according to the court, would be the proper
body to set forth such a rule. The court refused
to reverse the case on the grounds of insufficient
evidence and stated that the credibility of the
witness was a question for the trier of facts
and not open upon review. Also the court
would not consider the record in the first
trial, even though the defendant contended
that this record, taken with the record of the
second trial, showed that the prosecutrix's
testimony was impeached, contradicted, and
perjured. The record of the second trial contained only one statement made by the prosecutrix indicating that she never had sexual
relations with the defendant, and this record
was the only one that the court would consider.
The dissent interpreted the holding of the
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Burton case to be "that the uncorroborated
testimony of a prosecutrix who had not had a
psychiatric examination to test her credibility,
was not substantial evidence of probative
value upon which a conviction in a sex offense
could rest" (emphasis added). In addition, the
dissent stated that the majority did not reverse
the Burtow case because the reason for the
rule had ceased. Extensively citing noted
authorities, the dissent pointed out that the
danger of a female's false accusations of rape
have been recognized, yet "here the conviction
must stand upon the sole testimony of a prosecutrix who by the records here was proved to
be a pathological liar and perjurer". The dissent
seemed to have found no barrier prohibiting
it from considering the conflicting testimony
of the prosecutrix as shown by the record of the
first trial. However, the "most shocking aspect"
of the proceeding, according to the dissent,
was the fact that the State prosecuted the
case knowing full well that the testimony of
the prosecutrix was uncorroborated and yet a
psychiatric examination was not obtained. The
dissent accused the state, because of its continued prosecution after the perjuries had been
discovered, of conduct amounting to nothing
more than a face-saving procedure. In addition,
the dissent pointed out that the state never
attempted to deny the clear evidence that the
prosecution was threatened "with reform
school" prior to her signing the written charge
against the defendant.
Traffic Ticket Is Not Sufficient Information
to be Used as a Pleading and Defect Not
Waived by Guilty Plea-A patrolman issued a
"uniform traffic ticket" or summons to the
defendant. The ticket notified the defendant
to appear before a police justice the following
day to answer to the charge of driving while
intoxicated. The defendant, after being informed of his rights and possible penalties if
convicted, pleaded guilty and was fined. Leave
to appeal was granted and the Court of Appeals
of New York, three judges dissenting, reversed
and discharged the defendant on the ground
that a traffic ticket is not a sufficient information to be used as a pleading and that the
absence of a verified information was a juris-

dictional defect that was not waived by a plea
of guilty. People v. Scott, 3 N.Y.2d 148, 143
N.E.2d 901 (1957).
An information is an "allegation made to a
magistrate, that a person has been guilty of
some designated crime". This, according to
the court, is not the function of a traffic ticket,
which is merely a notice to appear at a given
court at a certain time where the issuee will
be charged with a specific crime. The court
also indicated that another objection to the
use of a traffic ticket as an information was
that it was not verified. Thus, since no information or complaint was placed before the
court, the conviction was defective unless the
requirement was waived by the defendant. The
court conceded that a plea of guilty will act
as a waiver of all defects in the form of an information, but this is not so with respect to
jurisdiction of the court. The lack of an information was then held to be a jurisdictional
defect, and the court stated that to allow a
"mere unverified summons ... to be the
equivalent of an information.., would be a
dangerous practice." The sworn information,
according to the court is an essential guarantee
to the fundamental right of not being punished
for a crime without a formal and sufficient
accusation, and this right can not be waived
by a guilty plea.
The dissent stated that the traffic ticket not
only performs the function pointed out by the
majority, but also gives the defendant "in
fullest detail the information as to what he is
charged with doing or failing to do contrary to
law". Thus, the traffic ticket by its very nature
is an informal information, according to the
dissent, and its only defect is the lack of verification. The dissent then pointed out that there
is no statutory requirement that a misdemeanor
information be sworn to, and the same is true
at common law. Therefore, the dissent stated,
the defect is one of form and is waived by a plea
of guilty.
Indictment Valid Even Though Defendant
Not Present at Preliminary Hearing-A justice of the peace held a preliminary hearing
at which the defendant was charged with
armed robbery, burglary, and a firearm vio-
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lation. The defendant was not present at the
hearing, but had been incarcerated in another
county prison of the same state. The authorities of the county in which the hearing took
place knew where the defendant was and that
he could have been brought to the hearing.
After the defendant was indicted he brought an
action to quash the indictment. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, in a per curiam opinion
with one judge dissenting, held that the defendant's absence at the preliminary hearing
was not adequate grounds upon which an
indictment could be quashed. Commonwealth
v. Laughlin, 132 A. 2d 265 (Penn. 1957).
The court said that unless a bill of indictment
is defective on its face, an adverse ruling to a
defendant's motion to quash an indictment
prior to trial is interlocutory and thus not
appealable. Therefore, the defendant's appeal to
the Superior Court need not have been decided
on its merits. The dissent pointed out that the
opinion of the superior court indicated that
where a defendant is not present at a preliminary hearing, court permissio. should be
obtained before a bill is presented to a grand
jury. This was not done in the present case, and
the dissent criticized the superior court for
giving its retroactive consent to the procedure
followed. In addition, the dissent commented
that the definition of a preliminary hearing
indicates that the defendant must be present,
and the absence of the defendent circumvented
one of the fundamental purposes of the preliminary hearing; that is, the defendant is not
allowed the early opportunity to clear himself.
The dissent stated that this "is part of the very
robe of assumed innocence with which the state
invests the accused from the very beginning of
the prosecution." The dissent considered a
preliminary hearing without the presence of the
accused as shocking, and said that unless the
accused has waived a hearing, purposely absents himself, or has fled the jurisdiction, the
rights of an accused are violated.
Interrogation by Trial Judge as Grounds for
New Trial-At the defendant's trial, the judge
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interrogated a number of the defense's witnesses
and the defendant himself. Many of the questions were rhetorical. Objections and motions
for a mistrial on the ground that portions of the
judge's questions were prejudicial against the
defendant were denied, and the Appellate
Division affirmed. However, the Court of
Appeals of New York granted the defendant a
new trial and held that the questions the judge
asked the defendant and his witnesses were of
such a nature as to indicate a communicable
disbelief of their testimony. People v. Mendes,
3 N. Y. 2d 120, 143 N. E. 2d 806 (1957).
The court stated the general rule that a trial
judge may take an active part in the examination of witnesses where his questions may clarify
or bring forth an issue, develop certain facts, or
merely facilitate the orderly and expeditious
progress of the trial. However, the court continued, this prerogative should be exercised
with caution, especially in such a case as that
at hand where a very close question was presented to the jury. The court indicated that the
"questions posed the threat of a cumulative
adverse effect on the defendant's position"
which the court felt could not be ignored
because of the close balance of the evidence.
The dissent contended that "there is no
power and no precedent in this court for the
reversal of a conviction on the ground that
some of the trial judge's questions to defendant
and his witnesses 'were of such a nature as to
indicate a communicable disbelief of their
testimony' ". Such a rule, according to the

dissent, would be unworkable, against public
interest and allow a judge to ask only the most
"insipid and formal questions." The dissent
also stated that in noncapital criminal cases the
court of appeals is a court of law and has no
general supervision over the conduct of trials.
Thus, the question of whether the defendant
received a fair trial was not a question for the
highest court of New York.
(For other recent case abstracts see "Police
Science Legal Abstracts and Notes", infra
pp. 476-478.)

